Clutch Hitting

 

 

 

 

By Rob Neyer, ESPN.com

December 17, 1999

 

 

Published here by permission of the author. If you like intelligent baseball talk that is backed up by solid analysis and presented with style and wit, check out Rob's daily column on ESPN.com.

 

As you might recall, last week I rather casually dismissed the idea of "clutch hitting." And as you might imagine, this resulted in a fair amount of consternation, if not outright derision, among a certain percentage of E-ville's baseball fans.

 

So I entered my library in search of evidence. Maybe I missed something. Might I have been too hasty?

 

In the 1977 edition of The Baseball Research Journal, Richard D. Cramer published an article titled, "Do Clutch Hitters Exist?"

 

Regrettably, I don't have the space to detail Cramer's methods here, but I consider them sound. Armed with play-by-play data for 1969 and 1970, Cramer checked to see if players who hit well in the clutch one season tended to do so the next season. They did not, which of course suggested that clutch hitting is not an ability, but rather a random fluctuation.

 

Eight years later, the good folks at the Elias Sports Bureau took Cramer to task in their annual book, The 1985 Elias Baseball Analyst. His conclusions, the authors wrote, were "unfounded" and "incorrect."

 

Elias came up with its own definition of "clutch," defined as any at-bat in the seventh inning or later, with the batter's team trailing by three runs or less (or four runs if the bases were loaded). Elias called this a Late-Inning Pressure Situation (LIPS).

 

Now, some might argue with that definition, but I will not. Everyone has their own idea of what "clutch" means, and this one's probably as good as any other.

 

Elias listed the 10 best and 10 worst clutch hitters in both 1983 and 1984, and checked to see what the groups did in the other season. Yes, those are tiny sample sizes, especially when you consider that some of the hitters had as few as 30 LIPS at-bats in one of the seasons. Elias examined the data and found "a definitive statement in favor of the existence of the clutch hitters."

 

Elias also identified 10 hitters known for their clutch ability, and ran a chart listing their LIPS averages and their overall batting averages from 1975 through 1984. The list of players included Steve Garvey, Reggie Jackson, Thurman Munson, Tony Perez and Willie Stargell. The Elias analysis? "The astonishing truth: only one of the players above -- Eddie Murray (thank God!) -- has performed significantly better over the past ten years in Line-Inning Pressure Situations."

 

(Incidentally, Murray batted .323 in 597 LIPS at-bats, .298 in all other at-bats, and I suspect this is not a significant difference. In fact, after four more seasons that 25-point difference dropped to 16.)

 

The message from Elias seemed to be, "Yes, there are clutch hitters. But they're not who you think they are." Fair enough. I enjoy a good bubble-bursting as much as the next fellow in line. But who are the clutch hitters? All Elias had to say about this was, "[T]here will emerge in time another group of players who are the true clutch hitters in baseball." Reading this, I couldn't understand why we couldn't see the "true" clutch hitters now. (I figured it out four years later, but we'll get to that in a few minutes.)

 

The Elias boys revisited the subject in 1988, and this time they didn't hold back, writing,

 

"As in the past, we feel it's our duty to demonstrate that clutch hitting isn't simply a random trait of a player's profile. To most of us, of course, that's obvious, and has been as long as there have been baseball fans to notice it. Nevertheless, a small group of shrill pseudo-statisticians has used insufficient data and faulty methods to try to disprove the existence of the clutch hitter. But with four seasons of statistics now in the public domain in the four editions of the Analyst, there's no longer an excuse for anyone not to recognize this simple fact of baseball life."

 

Sounds like a fun bunch of guys. I wonder if they hire out for children's birthday parties. Anyway, as it turns out, it was the authors of the Analyst who used insufficient data and faulty methods. In a way, I sympathize with them. They were writing for a mass audience, and mass audiences generally aren't interested in terms like "correlation coefficients" and such. Running the same sort of study as three years earlier, the reached the same conclusion: "... Nevertheless, when the clutch-hitting data is analyzed properly, the trends are undeniably apparent except to those who choose not to see." (Wow, and people say I'm smug.)

 

Among those who chose not to see was Harold Brooks, a member of the Society for American Baseball Research. Brooks is not afraid of correlation coefficients, and in an article published in the 1989 Baseball Research Journal, he subjected the Elias studies to some rigorous statistical tests, which I understand just enough to trust. Brooks' conclusion? "Based upon the data published in the 'Elias Baseball Analyst,' the conclusion that the Elias definition of clutch hitting is irrelevant is inescapable. Clutch hitting, as presently defined, is a mirage at best."

 

(If you want more details, you can order the 1977 and/or the 1989 Baseball Research Journals at SABR's web site. The Elias Baseball Analysts are long out of print, but may often be found at your favorite auction web site, quite reasonably priced.)

 

Also in 1989, Elias finally gave us what they hadn't four years earlier, a list of the greatest clutch hitters of the previous decade, the 25 major leaguers whose batting averages in Late-Inning Pressure Situations were more than 25 points better than in other situations.

 

Hold on a minute. Twenty-five points? That's not much, is it?

 

No, it's not. And hold on another minute, because it gets better. You only needed 250 LIPS at-bats to qualify for the list, and 250 at-bats isn't much, either.

 

What kind of numbers would be reasonable? Well, how about 35 points of batting average, and 400 LIPS at-bats?

 

You wanna guess how many great clutch hitters that left? Two.

 

And who might those two have been? George Brett and Mike Schmidt? Eddie Murray and Steve Garvey?

 

Nope. Tim Raines and Steve Sax.

 

From 1979 through 1988, Tim Raines batted .352 in so-called "pressure situations" and .296 the rest of the time. Even if you use Elias's limits (250 at-bats), Raines remains at the top of the list, just ahead of -- are you ready for this? -- Jeff Newman, Garth Iorg, Glenn Hoffman, Thad Bosley and Admin Milbourne.

 

And that is, I suspect, exactly why Elias never went out of their way to publicize this particular metric. For the most part, it tells us that The Great Clutch Hitters are not the players we lionized as great clutch hitters, but rather a bunch of stiffs like Jeff Newman and Admin Milbourne. That list -- the "Newman/Milbourne List" -- was printed in the Analyst without comment. None of the haughty pronouncements that accompanied their earlier analyses of clutch hitting. This time, just a chart in the back of the book, like a poor student slouching at his desk in the corner, hoping not to be called upon.

 

So where does all this leave us? Many baseball fans will respond with a resounding yawn because, evidence or no evidence, they know what their eyes and ears tell them. Intuitively, we know that there must be clutch hitters, right?

 

 

Rob, baseball does not exist in a vacuum. Clutch performances are not exclusive to baseball. People "perform" in the clutch every day in many capacities, i.e., careers, community and relationships. There are certain people who perform better in the "clutch" than others, "clutch" defined as an important period in time. Some people are just able to focus more, apply their knowledge better and add confidence at a time when the situation warrants it most. Without that increased pressure and reward, they do not perform at the same level. This works for baseball players as well. Some players are able to take that extra pitch in the clutch, others are not. Sociology and Statistics are both Social Sciences. Let's not forget Sociology.

 

Jeff Ullrich

 

Well, I've got an open mind on the subject. Do you?

 

First, it should be noted that by "clutch hitters," all the analysts are thinking of players who perform better under pressure than when not under pressure. This is the standard, I think, although one can certainly argue that a good clutch hitter is a hitter who hits well under pressure, regardless of what he does the rest of the time. However, by that definition, the best clutch hitters would almost always the best hitters, period. At least within the range of statistical chance.

 

And speaking of statistical chance, we already know that some hitters have performed particularly well under pressure. We would expect this, for the same reason that if you flip a coin one hundred times, over and over again, eventually you'll get heads 75 times in 100. The question here is whether hitters who have hit well under pressure will hit well. And as I've been saying, no such tendency has been demonstrated, at least not to my satisfaction.

 

Anyway, Jeff, you're right. People perform in the clutch every day, and in many capacities. What happens to people who perform well under pressure in their jobs? Right, they tend to be promoted, and then promoted again.

 

What are major league baseball players? Essentially, they're athletes who have been promoted as far as they can be promoted. There is no higher league. You know what I think? I think that in the great majority of cases, baseball players who can't handle pressure simply don't reach the major leagues. Those guys get weeded out on the way up, because in essence every professional at-bat is a "pressure situation." Wouldn't you agree that standing at home plate with thousands of eyes watching, and a behemoth throwing a baseball 95 miles an hour at you from 60 feet away, is a "pressure situation"?

 

If you can relax, stay focused in that situation, even if it's the first inning and the bases are empty, is it a giant leap to stay relaxed and focused in the bottom of the ninth with the winning run in scoring position? I respectfully submit that it's not.

 

You know what else? I think that this obsession sports fans have with "clutch hitters" and "money players" is yet another manifestation of what I will call our "need for explanation." We humans simply aren't content with thoughtless gods like Dame Fortune and The Great Unknowable. They scare us. Give us the willies, the creepy-crawlies.

 

So we invent mythical creatures like "the clutch hitter," in hopes that maybe the dreaded Imps of Ramdomland will leave us alone, at least while we're watching the ballgame in the presumed safety of our own homes.

 

Hey, I'm keeping an open mind, just like I have an open mind when it comes to the Loch Ness Monster, and Bigfoot, and flying saucers piloted by little green men. But you know, it's funny; people offer, as evidence, blurry photos of those things, and when you look at them, really look at them with the tools available to men of science, you find out that the Loch Ness Monster is a log in the vague shape of plesiosaur, Bigfoot is a big guy in a monkey suit, and the flying saucer is a flying Frisbee.

 

And if you look, really look at the "evidence" of clutch hitting as a true ability rather than happenstance, you find out that, at best, it's a bunch of blurry photos, in the form of poorly constructed studies presented by people who desperately want to believe.

 

Like I said, I'm keeping an open mind. But to this point, all I've seen are blurry photos. When you've got more than that, you'll know where to find me. I'll be home watching "The X-Files," waiting for the episode where Mulder thinks he's finally found a real clutch hitter, and Scully doesn't believe him. The truth is out there.

 

________________

Diamond Mind Email Newsletter #9

 

 

August 30, 2000

Written by Tom Tippett

 

Welcome to the fourth edition of the Diamond Mind email newsletter for the year 2000. Through these newsletters, we will try to keep you up to date on the latest product and technical information about the Diamond Mind Baseball game, related player disks, and our ongoing baseball research efforts. Back issues are available on our web site (www.diamond-mind.com).

 

If you don't wish to receive these messages in the future, please send an email response with the subject line "unsubscribe". We'll immediately remove your email address from the list. And if you know someone who would like to subscribe to this newsletter, we'll be happy to add them to the mailing list if they send us an email message with the subject line "subscribe" and their name and street address in the body of the message.

 

Topics for this issue:

 

Clutch hitting

Version 8 update

 

Clutch hitting

Last December, Rob Neyer of ESPN.com wrote an article that sums up the attempts that have been made to demonstrate which players can properly be regarded as clutch hitters. That article is no longer available on ESPN.com, but Rob was gracious enough to grant us permission to publish it on our web site, and you can find it at:

 

http://www.diamond-mind.com/articles/neyerclutch.htm

 

Regular readers of this newsletter know that I highly recommend Rob's column, which can be found at the following address:

 

http://espn.go.com/mlb/columns/neyer_rob/42798.html

 

Rob presents both sides of the debate about whether clutch hitting exists, so I won't get into the details here. But it boils down to two points of view. The media takes for granted that certain players can be counted on to rise to the occasion and that you can identify those players by looking at batting averages in the late innings of close games or with runners in scoring position. On the other hand, the baseball analysis community hasn't been able to find any compelling evidence to suggest that this is true.

 

This is relevant for Diamond Mind Baseball because we include clutch ratings for hitters and jam ratings for pitchers on our season disks. Because there was no evidence that clutch hitting really exists, my original design did not include clutch and jam ratings. But when I signed the deal that led to the game being marketed by Pursue the Pennant from 1987-94, the folks at PTP insisted that I add these ratings.

 

The best argument for including them goes like this. If a real-life team happened to have three or four guys who compiled better stats in clutch situations (however you define them) than in non-clutch situations, chances are they won more games than normal given the talent on their roster. So if we take the side of the researchers who say that clutch hitting doesn't exist, we'd leave these ratings out of our game, and teams like this could fall short of its real-life win total in season replays.

 

But just because someone batted thirty points higher in 'clutch' situations than in other situations, it doesn't necessarily mean that he was a prime-time player. Most regulars get only 50-75 atbats in clutch situations in a season. With any group of atbats of this size, you'll have no trouble finding players who were up and others who were down solely due to chance. So how do we tell the difference between a player who got lucky and a player who rose to the occasion?

 

And what are clutch situations anyway? If you define them as the late innings of close games, then it's not a clutch effort when a hitter blows open a close game with a three-run homer in the sixth. If you define them as any situation with runners in scoring position, then it's not a clutch effort when a pesky leadoff hitter draws a walk and goes on to score the tying run. I submit that there are a lot more clutch situations than the media tends to include in their 'analysis'.

 

Even if we could come up with a consensus on how to define clutch situations, and even if there was compelling evidence that certain players consistently come through in these situations, I'm still left with a troubling question. If someone compiles better stats in clutch situations, doesn't that mean he's not performing at his best in other situations? Doesn't that suggest that he's coasting or failing to focus adequately in the early innings or when nobody is on base?

 

(By the way, most of the research has focused on attempts to find players whose stats improve in clutch situations, but it's possible that clutch performers distinguish themselves by maintaining their levels while others decline. In the past three years, batting averages have been 6-14 points lower in the late innings of close games than in all situations combined. This may reflect nothing more than the fact that you're generally facing the opposition's best pitchers in these situations, but there might be some clutch-related stuff involved, too.)

 

I could go on, but suffice it to say that I'm not convinced that clutch ratings belong in a game like ours that is designed to reflect what really happens in baseball. But I can't honestly say that this matter has been fully researched either, and until we have the time to do a comprehensive study of our own, I have to admit that it's possible that clutch performers do exist even though the baseball research community cannot prove it. Besides, these ratings have been in the game for thirteen years, and they're going to stay.

 

If you use the clutch ratings, you probably want to know what effect they have, so if you haven't already heard this, I'll repeat it here. They come into play in the late innings of close games regardless of whether there are runners on base or not. They do not have a large effect on the outcome of the batter-pitcher confrontation, however, and I would never choose to use a weaker player over a better one just because he has a superior clutch rating. That said, you will gain a small advantage if you have a clutch or jam rating in your favor.

 

Version 8 update

I'm happy to report that we began field testing version 8 about three weeks ago. In that time, we've been focusing much of our effort on testing the game and fixing the bugs that have been reported, but we've also found time to make good progress on the last few features that we're adding.

 

The one I'd like to talk about now is the ability to save a game in progress and resume it later. During a recent visit with my wife's family, my 11-year-old nephew spent much of the time playing with version 8 on my notebook computer. On several occasions, he was in the middle of a game when we all needed to leave for a family outing. Because it tends to overheat, I prefer to shut this computer off when I'm going to be away for a while. But turning it off meant telling my nephew that he'd have to forget about the game that was underway.

 

It had always been part of the plan to add the ability to save a game and resume it later, and this experience only reinforced the need for this feature. So, in version 8, we've added a menu command that allows you to save any exhibition or league game. Because league games involve year-to-date stats, injuries, and fatigue information, you won't be allowed to resume that game if you have subsequently changed the rosters of the two teams, played or imported any other games involving the two teams, or done anything else that could cause the information in our database to get out of synch. A saved exhibition game stands alone, so it can always be resumed.

 

While we were adding this capability, we also added a feature in which the state of the game is automatically saved after every play. The purpose is to provide a safety net for anyone who suffers an untimely problem with their computer. If Windows crashes or is shut down during a game, or if you're playing a game online with the help of software like NetMeeting and your connection is dropped, you'll be able to resume the game right where you left off.

 

The version 8 to-do list is getting shorter every day, and you'll be the first to know when we have a formal ship date to announce. In the meantime, we're going to finish up the handful of new features that are still in the works, and we'll tell you about them in the next newsletter.

 

________________

 

ONE THING I DID NOT MENTION IN THE PAPER WAS THAT THE AVERAGE OPS FOR EXPERIENCED PLAYERS (2000 OR MORE PA) IN THE NONCLUTCH WAS .815 AND .808 IN THE CLUTCH, A DROP OF ONLY .007. FOR THE INEXPERIENCED PLAYERS, THEIR NONCLUTCH OPS WAS .792 AND NONCLUTCH WAS .741. A DROP OF .051, MUCH LARGER THAN FOR THE EXPERIENCED PLAYERS. THE DIFFERENCE IN DECLINES IS .044. THAT IS HIGH IN BASEBALL TERMS. THERE IS A RELATIVELY SMALL DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE TWO GROUPS OF PLAYERS IN THE NONCLUTCH BUT A MUCH LARGER ONE IN THE CLUTCH SITUATIONS.

 

Clutch Hitting and Experience

 

 

Cyril Morong

 

 

 

Experience may have a positive influence on performance in certain clutch situations, holding hitting ability in general constant. Hitting ability and performance were measured using Production, the sum of slugging percentage and on-base percentage.

 

 

 

 

 

Introduction

 

 

Does clutch hitting exist? That is, do some hitters hit better in the clutch than others or better in the clutch than they themselves normally hit? If a hitter bats .300 from the seventh inning on we might think he?s a great clutch hitter but he might be a .300 hitter all of the time, so his clutch performance is not really so extraordinary. If a hitter bats .400 from the seventh inning on we might think he?s a great clutch hitter but wonder why he does not hit .400 all the time if he can do so in the clutch. What would allow him to hit so much better in the clutch? Why would he do better when the pressure is on? Do some hitters do worse when the pressure is on, and if so, why? If a hitter is a good clutch hitter does it mean he simply maintains his normal level of performance in the clutch and does not wilt under pressure?

 

 

 

David Grabiner has done an excellent study on clutch hitting and finds no evidence that clutch hitting exists. The correlations he found of clutch hitting in one year to previous years were quite low (.01).[1] This study takes a different angle.

 

 

 

In general hitters do worse in the clutch (defined below) than they do in non-clutch situations. (more on this in the Data section below) This study raises the question of whether or not more experienced hitters hit better in the clutch than less experienced hitters.

 

 

 

The Data

 

 

Data from the 1995 major league season was used. The clutch situation used was ?Close & Late? from the STATSTM Player Profiles 1996 from STATS, Inc. This occurs when ?a) the game is in the seventh inning or later and b) the batting team is either leading by one run, tied, or has the potential tying run on base, at bat or on deck.? Players with 60 or more plate appearances (PA?s, walks + at-bats) only were included. That was the qualification for being among the league leaders in this statistic in the book.

 

 

 

How do hitters perform in the clutch in general? In major league baseball in 1995, for example, the slugging percentage (SLG) in clutch situations was .393 while in non-clutch situations it was .421. For on-base percentage (OBP) these numbers were .3346 and .3353, respectively.[2] So hitters generally did worse in the clutch than non-clutch. This was true in 1994 as well. What might explain this is that relief pitchers are often brought in late in the game and a hitter has not faced them yet. Also, a left-handed pitcher might be brought in to face a left-handed hitter and a right-handed pitcher might be brought in to face a right-handed hitter. It is not clear that the pressure of the situation is what makes these numbers lower, because the pitchers are under pressure, too.

 

 

 

With it being more difficult to hit in the clutch, any hitter who simply maintain his normal performance level might be considered to be a good clutch hitter.

 

 

 

Hitters were divided into two groups: the inexperienced, those with less than 2000 previous major league PA?s (prior to 1995) and the experienced, those with 2000 or more previous major league PA?s. If a player plays every game and gets 4 PA?s per game, he would have about 2000 after 3 years.

 

 

 

Performance in both clutch and non-clutch situations was measured using Production (PROD), which is the sum of SLG and OBP.[3]

 

 

 

The Model

 

 

An ordinary least squares regression was run using a hitter?s PROD in the clutch (CPROD) as the dependent variable and his PROD in non-clutch situations (NCPROD) as the independent variable. Here are the results:

 

 

 

The Results

 

 

N = 175

 

Adjusted R2 = .187

 

F-Ratio = 41.11

 

 

 

Variable Coefficient T value P value

 

Constant 0.248 2.990 0.003

 

NCPROD 0.657 6.412

i believe in clutch hardcore.....

Do you think their are angels in the outfield? even sometimes?

 

just kidding! I agree with you.

Just take a look at Anti-Clutch himself Derreck Lee.

That's a lot to read. :blink:

Check out my sig...its a myth.

you just said it exists?!?!?!?!

Clutch hitting exists.....

 

Derek Jeter would be exposed as the overrated player he is without it.

From the data we have available clutch hitting does not show any universal trends, thus it may or may not exist but hasn't been proven either way.

Clutch hitting exists.....

 

Derek Jeter would be exposed as the overrated player he is without it.

He's good for a shortstop. unlike Jose Valentin!

Clutch hitting exists.....

 

Derek Jeter would be exposed as the overrated player he is without it.

He's good for a shortstop. unlike Jose Valentin! No argument here....

 

But Jeter is the most overrated baseball player I think i've ever seen, and it is really annoying to hear the east coast biased media kiss his a** all the time when he really isn't all that great, but just good.

He's good on the base paths, good batting average and on base, good slugging for an infielder...he had an .840 ops last year. he was good. His defense sucks though. He's horrible.

 

So offensively he's one of the best shortstops (you would know what I mean if you read my previous arguments), but his defense is extremely overrated.

 

However, living in NY, Jeter used to be comapred to A Rod, which is a friggin' joke, but he was batting close to .340 so he got away with it. He no longer draws comparisons to A Rod, so a lot of the "overrated" part went away. He's a rip off though.

 

However, he's one great postseason hitter.

I believe clutch hitting exists, because Anderson's not a power hitter but he can hit, like mix of power & contact hitting.

He's good on the base paths, good batting average and on base, good slugging for an infielder...he had an .840 ops last year. he was good. His defense sucks though. He's horrible.

 

So offensively he's one of the best shortstops (you would know what I mean if you read my previous arguments), but his defense is extremely overrated.

 

However, living in NY, Jeter used to be comapred to A Rod, which is a friggin' joke, but he was batting close to .340 so he got away with it. He no longer draws comparisons to A Rod, so a lot of the "overrated" part went away. He's a rip off though.

 

However, he's one great postseason hitter.

I can't argue with any of that.

My problem with the numbers everyone uses to measure clutch hitting is how much better they do in "LIPS" and "CLS" (Close and Late Situations) than in normal situations. But is this really accurate?

 

My Case (and Soriano, I've been watching baseball since the Marlins started to exist 11 years ago when I was 6, so I don't use numbers most of the time but what I see, which is what I deem more important):

 

Look at the Marlins, shall we? Miguel Cabrera is the first example. Superman is what I started calling him, because from the day he came up he was clutch (Walk off homer in extra innings in his very first game). He had some struggles here and there during normal situations that a rookie will have, and we had a joke going around with my friends that he could only hit if there was a man on second. Cabrera was clutch. I believe his CLS (which is taken by ESPN) was a bit higher than his normal average. Also his RISP and RISP w/ CLS. Pudge, in the regular season, also had a way higher RISP average than his CLS (RISP for me classifies as Clutch, regardless of inning, if it is a close game. Because frankly blown oppurtunities with RISP in the early innings will cost you games later in the game, therefore you need to be clutch). Conine also was huge when the pressure was on, namely games against the Phillies and his disgusting average in the playoffs (didn't he come close to setting the record for most hits in an entire playoffs?)

 

But can you be clutch without having a huge increase in CLS or LIPS or CHEEKS or w/e? Yes. My example? My boy, Juan Pierre. Does he drive in alot of runs in situations that everyone admits are "clutch" situations? Some yes, but not many. Does he get alot of walk off hits? He got a few, but that isn't what he does. And he was extraordinary all the time, so why is he clutch? Because he still excelled when the pressure was on. IMO, performance outside of the clutch is irrelevant to your clutch ability. If you perform in pressure situations, whether you were 3 for 3 going in to the situation or 0-3, you are clutch IMO. That is just how I look at it.

 

Look at Todd Hollandsworth. He didn't get much of a chance in regular situations in the postseason, but he was big in pinch hitting situations. He was clutch. Mike Mordecai, didn't get much chance, but he cleared the bases in the 8th of Game 6 to seal another day of baseball breath for us. He was clutch. You don't need to be a regular to be clutch. Alex Arias, Rick Renteria, and Lenny Harris come to mind as Pinch Hitters who are more clutch than 90% of regulars.

 

But clutch is not just an offensive skill. Defensive clutch can be almost as important. Mike Lowell's clutch homer in Boston? Yeah, that was clutch. But so was Juan Pierre's diving catch to start the inning ending DP in the bottom half of the inning. Superman, Juanpy, and Conine's huge catches in different OF situations down the stretch? Those were all clutch. And the definition of defensive cluth, the play that ended the NLDS: Conine to Pudge for out #27.

 

Clutch is also important in pitching. Josh Beckett was the definition of clutch during the whole playoffs (Game 1 of the NLCS was his only bad outing the whole entire playoffs). Carl Pavano was clutch as hell. Brad Penny? Discovered the clutch in the Series. Willis became clutch in situations coming out of the pen. Barring a few situations where they could have done better, the pen was clutch. Speaking of clutch, can there be any more clutch in this world than Mariano Rivera?

 

Clutch hitting, defense, and pitching is a skill. It is not fully understandable by stats. You can measure it somewhat, but the ways being used right now are faulty. Being clutch is performing well in any pressure situation, despite which side of the ball you are on.

 

Most importantly, the best way to tell clutch? Not through numbers. Through knowledge. You just know.

Juanky, I believe in clutch hitting, but it's msotly not measurable.

I wonder why we need to have a fricking stat for everything.

 

The baseball game (like everything in life) has a psycological side that can't be measured.

 

I only read the first article, and the author's logic has many flaws. He throws in blanket statement about every MLB player being able to handle pressure, and that's why they are at the best league in the world. I'm sorry, but those players were able to be good or "clutch" at minor league level, but they are now on the next level. That's like saying that if you were great in College, you will do great at your job. See the problem with this logic here?

Juanky, I do think that some players can perform better when necessary, whether they seek to or are just that calm. However it can't be measured, you have to rely on your gut feeling to make such a judgement. Don't pretend it can be, single-season stats are too small of a sample size.

He throws in blanket statement about every MLB player being able to handle pressure, and that's why they are at the best league in the world.

 

You pretty much just said it. His argument isn't empirical either.

Juanky, I do think that some players can perform better when necessary, whether they seek to or are just that calm. However it can't be measured, you have to rely on your gut feeling to make such a judgement. Don't pretend it can be, single-season stats are too small of a sample size.

Long term it can't be measured, no. You just have to go by what you see and what you know. But how a player is doing in the regular season can somewhat be measured by RISP. Not totally, but if he doesn't do well with RISP, then chances are he doesn't do very well when the pressure is on.

 

And this is coming from the biggest anti-stat guy here.