The questions at the table are was (1) Brattain correct in his assessment? Are (2) Brattain and Zimbalist of like minds, do they agree and does the latter provide the former with proof of his allegations?
My position is that Zimbalist actually understands the economics and tax consequences of what he's saying (see all his books, lectures, papers on the subject, etc.) and Brattain does not. Brattain has made a career out of hating on Loria and company. What he has done in the case of this article is take a small piece of tax law, misapply it and claim it as fact.
While I disagree with some theories Zimbalist has espoused that isn't the discussion at hand. There's a lot of criticism of Zimbalist on the web, and I don't mean by that by the lunatic fringe, and I use the word criticism to mean discussion of differing points of view, often by accountants and others who ply their trades in this same universe. But not on this subject. For today, I'm just taking Zimbalist at face value, accepting what he says because in the end he doesn't support Brattain's contention anywhere.
The issue really becomes one of "did people actually read what Brattain wrote?" because as you will see below in this short recap before I explain why he's wrong - and why most people who buy into the general theory the Marlins are making millions of dollars, pocketing the money (a favorite phrase here) and covering it up with tax losses - are wrong, ignoring for the moment that his math is wrong, Brattain's underlieing belief is fatally flawed.
Just so no one can say I used numbers they don't agree with I'm using Forbes Magazine baseball valuation numbers, the very same ones the most vocal critics of the Marlins love to quote over and over and over.
But here is what Brattain says:
"As you know the Marlins were purchased by Jeffrey Loria for about $150 million in 2002. Over the first five years after purchase an owner can amortize 50% of that. In other words, the Marlins can make a book entry in the loss column in years 1-5 of ownership for $15 million.
They've owned the Marlins for four full seasonsergo $60 million of their purported "loss" are from that. Furthermore, the value of the franchise has increased over that same span almost $70 million."
Brattain makes a declarative sentence. The "purported losses" of the Florida over the period 2002-2005 was due to a depreciation allowance, the clear implication being they made a profit during the five year but hid it by using these tax write-offs.
Except that Forbes, as I'll show below, disagrees.
Anyways, back to the point, here's what I said:
"4. Even Swift's favorite source Prof(essor Andrew) Zimbalist concurs the tax laws (IRS) regarding amortization do not apply as quoted here but when you're on a roll and you have a man's reputation to destroy, heck why let the facts get in the way."
Zimbalist does not stick to Brattain's hard and fast 50% rule, rather he correctly says:
"generally", Zimbalist writes "baseball owners generally may attribute 50% of the price they pay for a franchise..."
leaving open numerous possible economic scenarios. Nor is it written anywhere by Professor Zimbalist that during the five year period the Marlins were otherwise profitable. There's a significant difference between the fuzzy math Wayne Huizenga used to claim a $13 million loss in 1997 and Zimbalist rightly exposed that as a fraud (using the fact he was also the landlord to gain a tax advantage) and the Marlins situation where they are the lessee under the worst lease in baseball.
Further he states and more to the point: (see link from Biz of Baseball) Read 57 & 58 (and please the screen capture is presented only to show the reader where the operative language is but to put it in context read the available pages before and after this pull-out to get a wider understanding of what's being postulated)
STOP HERE GO READ THE FIRST LINK, scroll up and start at the top of the chapter
http://books.google.com/books?id=aX-GBXLQN...1czRCE#PPA57,M1
based on his notion that his example team is worth $400 million in 2003 when the book was written and had cummulative short and longterm contracts worth the magic 50% or $200 million which is somewhat believable when you think of which franchises were worth $400 million then and the money they spent annually and on longterm contracts. (Keep in mind if you're paying a player $15 million for five years, and he stays with your club for the term of the contract, that's $75 million right there. So getting to $200 million with Zimbalist's mythical team makes sense if you're a highly profitable team in a big market with boatloads of positive cashflow, and you would have to be to be worth $400 million in 2003. In 2007 half the teams in baseball, in fact more, are still below Zimbalist's $400 million valuation threshold. Forbes 2007 Team Valuations
But let's go back to what I said, "Zimbalist concurs the tax laws (IRS) regarding amortization do not apply as quoted here..."
And the reason I make that statement is because Zimbalist, being an expert on tax law as it affects sports generally, not just baseball, he has written after all on the tax implications in football and soccer) would never make the same mistake as Brattain, which is to confuse when and how that depreciation is used. For whatever problems one might have with some of Zimbalist's theories, he is an he is an economist, an expert, he consults to Forbes, and in fact he consults to Major League Baseball. Clearly this is a man who understands the tax consequences. This is why as you read his words he uses words and phrases like "may" and "up to" and "generally" repeatedly. (By the way, one thing worth mentioning is the IRS does not differeniate between sports - hockey, baseball, basketbal, football and I assume soccer are all treated the same by the IRS)
Sports "Up to 50%" Rule in Zimbalist's words
"...when an individual buys a franchise, he is allowed to amortize the value of the player contracts up to (a presumed) 50 percent of the purchase price..."
...he goes on to say it's a very valuable tax shelter. And it is. Were someone to ask me, I would say it's too good a deal and ought to be eliminated.
Why? because it's double dipping for the first five years "if you're making a profit". The team is already writing off player salaries as a legitimate expense every year but during the first five years they can also claim it as a depreciable allowance. If I have one complaint with Zimbalist it is that he looks at profitable teams and applies the same logic and set of beliefs to teams that are either margnally profitable, or unprofitable. But for today I'm not arguing he's wrong, intellectually, numerically or otherwise. A lot of what he says is interesting even if you don't buy in 100% ( with Murray Brown ),
And just claiming you have 50% doesn't work anymore either.
"The process of convincing the IRS to even grant the 50 percent deduction became harder when local auditors usually assigned to Despite a World Series title, random projects were replaced by national auditors who specialized in the finances of sports teams, said Carl Fortner, a tax partner on Foley & Lardner's Sports Industry Team, which has counseled several professional team owners on tax issues, including Selig. In October, the IRS sent a 15-page memo to those that audit teams to be aware of the latest government standards as it applied to taxing franchises.
"The IRS has been much less receptive to greater deductions because franchises cost so much
these days," said Bob DuPuy, president and chief operating officer of Major League Baseball.
Whereas it used to be automatic that a team owner could attribute a huge chunk of the franchise
price to player salaries, team owners now have to hire auditors who determine a true market value for the player's contract instead of the actual dollars being paid to player.
It is that value, according to Fortner, that is shown to the IRS. Unlike decades ago, where owners
would simply spread the costs over the first five years of ownership, player contracts in most cases now may be depreciated based on the length of individual contacts. This debunks the theory that new owners are more likely to sell after their fifth year of ownership because the write-off period is longer. Plus, owners are allowed to depreciate other intangible assets, including season ticket waiting lists
and suite revenues."
(Depreciation Accountancy from ESPN )
From the definition work on sports and the IRS, the IRS says:
(see link from The Business of Baseball - go to link, for IRS rules but SCROLL TO THE TOP OF THE SECTION TITLED "Profitability" AND READ THE ENTIRE SECTION )
http://books.google.com/books?id=0QrLjDDES...IzzI_E#PPA82,M1
The IRS citations regarding how and under what condition(s) the 50% rule applies are clear, a furtherance of Zimbalist's somewhat liberal use of the word "generally", which turns out to be a different percentage calculated on a case by case basis and confirming the Fortner article above.
Another important article to read is in regards to assets, tangible and intangible, and how they affect the economics of baseball from a taxable standpoint. This is actually a good article to read as a life lesson, it explains more or less in lay terms what you can can't do, why you can do some things and not others, whether buying a tractor or a house or a baseball team this, while lengthy is an excellent read.
Depreciation Allowance Recapture and Tangible vs Intangible Property
For our purposes we're focusing on the tenth paragraph titled
"Other Intangible Property Subject to an Allowance for Depreciation
Intangible personal property subject to the allowance for depreciation also constitutes Section 1245 property, including personal property rights such as patents, copyrights, and subscription lists, employment contracts such as basketball and baseball player contracts, covenants not to compete which are subject to the allowance for depreciation, and media rights to films, video tapes and sound recordings. Regs. Section 1.167(a)-3. As these properties all provide for a depreciation allowance, these properties will, if disposed of at a gain, be subject to depreciation recapture under Section 1245."
In this case "disposed of at a gain" means eliminating the obligation, the portion of a player's contract left that the team was originally entitled to amortize is now recaptured. So if you have Bob Jones at $30 million for five years on your books when you bought the team and you trade him in year two, you've saved paying him $24 million but you've also lost the depreciation going forward on the rest of his contract. And what did the Marlins do over 2002 and early 2003? They traded away four of their highest paid players, thus triggering a recapture, or dilution of the depreciation allowance. Brattain's orginall premise is wrong on it's face.
If you've read this link
this is just further confirmation of what was stated above, the IRS gives itself the right to determine in each and every case the worthiness of any depreciable allowance for player contracts and that the IRS position is an owner cannot allocate 50% to player salaries at the time of the purchase and sale without first satisfying auditors who will foresenically evaluate each contract. In short, the owner must prove he has 50% of the purchase price in salaries and the IRS will challenge every application for player contract depreciation. More importantly, as is seen in the exhibit, the depreciation allowance only applies so long as those players remain with the team.
The Marlins were purchased for $158 million (not the $150 million Brattain uses). The total depreciation allowance was created by taking payroll in 2002 which was $46 million ($ 41 million on USAToday, $46 million on Forbes, I assume the difference is minor league guaranteed contracts, players coming and going, etc.) plus what was owed to just a few players with contracts longer than a year (see roster, go to Cots, look at the historical contract of each player, you have to follow them to the team they on now, except for Charles Johnson who you can find a story on Google regarding his contract) All together the Marlins had approximately $92 million in contract and longer term contractural obligations (Floyd, was in the last year of this contract and headed to free agency, Wilson, Johnson, Lowell, pretty much the rest were on one year contracts. 2002 was also the last year of Beckett's original deal). Dempster had a multi-year deal in place, but it was small money, if memory serves somewhere around a million dollars over two years.
Even before 2002 was over the team reduced its potential player contract depreciation by roughly $3.5 million when Cliff Floyd and Ryan Dempster were traded mid-season. The next season Wilson and Johnson, who at the beginning of the 2003 season were owed collectively $52.5 million ( Wilson/Johnson remaining contract value when traded ) are traded to Colorado. So when you do the math at the end of the day the Marlins had as a result of the purchase at most potentially about a $30-35 million writeoff over the five year period.
This dovetails with David Samson's oft-quoted remark:
""If we had a loss of $60 million on paper, but $20 million in cash, that's a
big difference," said David Samson, president of the Marlins, which
reportedly lost $20 million last season despite winning the World Series.
"But the only number Jeffrey cares about is that actual cash loss. The
benefit of depreciation is far outweighed by the reality of cash losses
when you are losing money operationally."
( From ESPN )
This quote has been widely misinterpreted. His contention is, and correctly, that paper losses are worthless when you're losing money, the only thing that matters is how many real dollars the franchise actually lost. It should be noted here Forbes (see chart below) says the loss in 2003, the World Series year, was $14 million, and we can argue all day which is the right number $20 million or $14 million, but the point is made the Marlins, because of their lease, even with all $ from the playoffs, parking, mechandising, concessions, etc., still were unprofitable BEFORE ANY DEPRECIATION OR OTHER ALLOWANCE OR WRITE-OFF WAS TAKEN.
Write-offs do one thing. They shelter "profits". YOU HAVE TO HAVE PROFITS TO SHELTER or the depreciation allowance, or any other write-off is useless. You can't go below break-even on a cash basis.
This is where Brattain went wrong in his lust to paint Loria as nefarious.
IF YOU LOSE $2 MILLION BEFORE DEPRECIATION AND HAVE $20 MILLION IN DEPRECIATION UNCLE SAM DOESN'T WRITE YOU A CHECK FOR EITHER $2 MILLION OR $22 MILLION. YOU LOSE THE MONEY, TOUGH LUCK. And in a partnership, Loria couldn't just grab these losses for himself, he would have to distribute them among all the partners, and since MLB frowns on this action anyways, it's reasonably safe to assume it didn't happen.
I've been alluding to this all along but let's go to Forbes and use their numbers for the period 2002 - 2006 because after all I wouldn't want someone to say I was cooking the books.
2002 - 2006 is the five year period when the player contract depreciation "may" be used. It expires worthless after that. There is no carryover.
(on the left) These are Forbes Operating Income numbers for the Florida Marlins. According to Forbes the Marlins made $1 million in 2002, lost 14 million in 2003, lost 12 million in 2004, made $3 million in 2005 and in the last year the depreciation allowance can be used - 2006 - the Marlins lost 12 million.
Operating Income is calculated BEFORE interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization or as its known EBITDA. (Forbes defines Operating Incomes as follows: "5Earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization.")
Go to the Forbes website link provided here:
http://www.forbes.com/lists/2007/33/07mlb_...ins_336786.html And let's be clear on one other thing, Forbes revenue numbers include estimated revenue-sharing etc and other distributions, from MLB for all teams, not just the Marlins.
So in reality, of all that depreciation allowance theoretically created by the purchase of the franchise and allowance of player contracts that Brattain makes such a big deal over, the Marlins "generally" had reason to use, if you believe Forbes, and those are the numbers the naysayers keep pointing at, a grand total of $4 million from the sale, and this is if they didn't have a single other item like interest on and depreciation of hard assets they could of used instead.
In short the depreciation allowance created by depreciating player contracts from the purchase of the franchise in 2002 was virtually worthless and not as Brattain suggests the reason the Marlins "purportedly " lost money.
The reason the Marlins lost net $37 *34*million from 2002-2006 is because BEFORE DEPRECIATION they lost $37 *34* million.
That's what Forbes says. Not because of hocus pocus math, they flat out lost money. And I suspect when the final 2007 numbers are in (re: Forbes +$40 mil estimate) they may show a pre-ebitda profit, but (considering low attendance vs tickets sold) they will earn less from parking and concessions, merchandising, etc. which will drive down overall profits. Plus you still have a situation where salaries, just at the MLB level are twice gate receipts. But it's better than 2005 when it was almost 3 times.
I suggest you read the entire chapter online at the link provided. Above is the relevant section.
So, I think I've shown rather conclusively that Brattain was incorrect in what he said, that the Marlins "puported" losses were the result of player contract depreciation over the period 2002-2006. Not only was it not $75 million as he claimed (half of his $150 figure) Forbes doesn't agree with that assessment and neither should anyone here, and I doubt there's an economist or accountant that would disagree. They lost money during the period, $34 million, out of operating expenses, not because of any other reason.
This fantasy that the Marlins have been making money hand over fist is just that, a fantasy. People can cherry pick stuff from the Forbes reports all they want, but in the end the profitability graph shows it all. And we'll see where 2007 ends up next year when Forbes does their annual wrapup.
I hope people find this of value. It was an education for me.