New York Times

August 19, 2007

 

Op-Ed Contributors

 

The War as We Saw It

 

By BUDDHIKA JAYAMAHA, WESLEY D. SMITH, JEREMY ROEBUCK, OMAR MORA, EDWARD SANDMEIER, YANCE T. GRAY and JEREMY A. MURPHY

 

Baghdad- VIEWED from Iraq at the tail end of a 15-month deployment, the political debate in Washington is indeed surreal. Counterinsurgency is, by definition, a competition between insurgents and counterinsurgents for the control and support of a population. To believe that Americans, with an occupying force that long ago outlived its reluctant welcome, can win over a recalcitrant local population and win this counterinsurgency is far-fetched. As responsible infantrymen and noncommissioned officers with the 82nd Airborne Division soon heading back home, we are skeptical of recent press coverage portraying the conflict as increasingly manageable and feel it has neglected the mounting civil, political and social unrest we see every day. (Obviously, these are our personal views and should not be seen as official within our chain of command.)

 

The claim that we are increasingly in control of the battlefields in Iraq is an assessment arrived at through a flawed, American-centered framework. Yes, we are militarily superior, but our successes are offset by failures elsewhere. What soldiers call the ?battle space? remains the same, with changes only at the margins. It is crowded with actors who do not fit neatly into boxes: Sunni extremists, Al Qaeda terrorists, Shiite militiamen, criminals and armed tribes. This situation is made more complex by the questionable loyalties and Janus-faced role of the Iraqi police and Iraqi Army, which have been trained and armed at United States taxpayers? expense.

 

A few nights ago, for example, we witnessed the death of one American soldier and the critical wounding of two others when a lethal armor-piercing explosive was detonated between an Iraqi Army checkpoint and a police one. Local Iraqis readily testified to American investigators that Iraqi police and Army officers escorted the triggermen and helped plant the bomb. These civilians highlighted their own predicament: had they informed the Americans of the bomb before the incident, the Iraqi Army, the police or the local Shiite militia would have killed their families.

 

As many grunts will tell you, this is a near-routine event. Reports that a majority of Iraqi Army commanders are now reliable partners can be considered only misleading rhetoric. The truth is that battalion commanders, even if well meaning, have little to no influence over the thousands of obstinate men under them, in an incoherent chain of command, who are really loyal only to their militias.

 

Similarly, Sunnis, who have been underrepresented in the new Iraqi armed forces, now find themselves forming militias, sometimes with our tacit support. Sunnis recognize that the best guarantee they may have against Shiite militias and the Shiite-dominated government is to form their own armed bands. We arm them to aid in our fight against Al Qaeda.

 

However, while creating proxies is essential in winning a counterinsurgency, it requires that the proxies are loyal to the center that we claim to support. Armed Sunni tribes have indeed become effective surrogates, but the enduring question is where their loyalties would lie in our absence. The Iraqi government finds itself working at cross purposes with us on this issue because it is justifiably fearful that Sunni militias will turn on it should the Americans leave.

 

In short, we operate in a bewildering context of determined enemies and questionable allies, one where the balance of forces on the ground remains entirely unclear. (In the course of writing this article, this fact became all too clear: one of us, Staff Sergeant Murphy, an Army Ranger and reconnaissance team leader, was shot in the head during a ?time-sensitive target acquisition mission? on Aug. 12; he is expected to survive and is being flown to a military hospital in the United States.) While we have the will and the resources to fight in this context, we are effectively hamstrung because realities on the ground require measures we will always refuse ? namely, the widespread use of lethal and brutal force.

 

Given the situation, it is important not to assess security from an American-centered perspective. The ability of, say, American observers to safely walk down the streets of formerly violent towns is not a resounding indicator of security. What matters is the experience of the local citizenry and the future of our counterinsurgency. When we take this view, we see that a vast majority of Iraqis feel increasingly insecure and view us as an occupation force that has failed to produce normalcy after four years and is increasingly unlikely to do so as we continue to arm each warring side.

 

Coupling our military strategy to an insistence that the Iraqis meet political benchmarks for reconciliation is also unhelpful. The morass in the government has fueled impatience and confusion while providing no semblance of security to average Iraqis. Leaders are far from arriving at a lasting political settlement. This should not be surprising, since a lasting political solution will not be possible while the military situation remains in constant flux.

 

The Iraqi government is run by the main coalition partners of the Shiite-dominated United Iraqi Alliance, with Kurds as minority members. The Shiite clerical establishment formed the alliance to make sure its people did not succumb to the same mistake as in 1920: rebelling against the occupying Western force (then the British) and losing what they believed was their inherent right to rule Iraq as the majority. The qualified and reluctant welcome we received from the Shiites since the invasion has to be seen in that historical context. They saw in us something useful for the moment.

 

Now that moment is passing, as the Shiites have achieved what they believe is rightfully theirs. Their next task is to figure out how best to consolidate the gains, because reconciliation without consolidation risks losing it all. Washington?s insistence that the Iraqis correct the three gravest mistakes we made ? de-Baathification, the dismantling of the Iraqi Army and the creation of a loose federalist system of government ? places us at cross purposes with the government we have committed to support.

 

Political reconciliation in Iraq will occur, but not at our insistence or in ways that meet our benchmarks. It will happen on Iraqi terms when the reality on the battlefield is congruent with that in the political sphere. There will be no magnanimous solutions that please every party the way we expect, and there will be winners and losers. The choice we have left is to decide which side we will take. Trying to please every party in the conflict ? as we do now ? will only ensure we are hated by all in the long run.

 

At the same time, the most important front in the counterinsurgency, improving basic social and economic conditions, is the one on which we have failed most miserably. Two million Iraqis are in refugee camps in bordering countries. Close to two million more are internally displaced and now fill many urban slums. Cities lack regular electricity, telephone services and sanitation. ?Lucky? Iraqis live in gated communities barricaded with concrete blast walls that provide them with a sense of communal claustrophobia rather than any sense of security we would consider normal.

 

In a lawless environment where men with guns rule the streets, engaging in the banalities of life has become a death-defying act. Four years into our occupation, we have failed on every promise, while we have substituted Baath Party tyranny with a tyranny of Islamist, militia and criminal violence. When the primary preoccupation of average Iraqis is when and how they are likely to be killed, we can hardly feel smug as we hand out care packages. As an Iraqi man told us a few days ago with deep resignation, ?We need security, not free food.?

 

In the end, we need to recognize that our presence may have released Iraqis from the grip of a tyrant, but that it has also robbed them of their self-respect. They will soon realize that the best way to regain dignity is to call us what we are ? an army of occupation ? and force our withdrawal.

 

Until that happens, it would be prudent for us to increasingly let Iraqis take center stage in all matters, to come up with a nuanced policy in which we assist them from the margins but let them resolve their differences as they see fit. This suggestion is not meant to be defeatist, but rather to highlight our pursuit of incompatible policies to absurd ends without recognizing the incongruities.

 

We need not talk about our morale. As committed soldiers, we will see this mission through.

 

Buddhika Jayamaha is an Army specialist. Wesley D. Smith is a sergeant. Jeremy Roebuck is a sergeant. Omar Mora is a sergeant. Edward Sandmeier is a sergeant. Yance T. Gray is a staff sergeant. Jeremy A. Murphy is a staff sergeant.

 

Link

I thought that the two paragraphs that I bolded said the most about this conflict, and certainly said it better than I could.

I could probably post 500 first hand accounts that have a complete opposite view.

 

I'm sure this will be good late night material for you though.

I could probably post 500 first hand accounts that have a complete opposite view.

 

I'm sure this will be good late night material for you though.

typical answer

Except that this comes from a large group of soldiers, and not just an individual. I suppose if you want to continue to live in a delusional fantasy, then you can ignore the bad news. Have fun.

Seven is not a "large group."

I believe it was legacy who brought up the point that everyone who goes to war with their opinion on it just sees what reinforces that belief.

 

Soldiers are just like the rest of us, all have differing opinions and I don't need to hear it from them to know a sh*t hole.

Seven is not a "large group."

The Chicago 7.

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In all seriousness...anecdotal evidence = worthless.

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.In all seriousness, getting shot in the head is not anecdotal evidence.

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Let's hope that this op-ed piece marks a moment in time where sanity and clarity triumph over propaganda.

The key point in the article is that until the Iraqis step up to the plate and try to reconcile their differences, we're going to be in an endless conflict.

 

Who knows how long this is going to take? The only thing the Iraqi 'government' did all summer was go on vacation. Meanwhile, our soldiers are dying on average about 100 a month, for nothing. Not much to say beyond that.

I'll have to concede that anecdotal evidence can support either side. Even though I think these guys make great points that should be addressed, they are stuck in the mudy waters as there are certainly essays on the other side of the debate that make just as strong of points, as recently posted by EricWeiner I think.

 

That said, my argument is still the same. How long are the stay the course folks willing to continue to want to stay the course? Maybe things settle down within 3 months. Maybe 1 year. But it is extremely likely that things won't settle down for an extremely long period of time. Even Bush's own generals have said this.

 

So ultimately, the only thing assuring us that everything will be a-ok is the same group of people who told us there were WMDs and Hussein was an immenent threat, told us Hussein was linked to 9.11(both of which even Bush has conceded on), told us the post-war process would go smoothly, told us the insurgency was in its last throes, told was there would be no civil war, and many many other things. So why should I trust Bush this time?

 

I will say that if this surge works and things settle down, I'll be happy and Bush wins. Heck, there are good things happening, like people turning on AQ. But we can't ignore the reality that certain things are bad indicators for overall stability. The vacations by the Iraqi government, the withdrawal by Sunnies, the fact that our political manipulation is becoming more hands on and involved, the role of Iran. These are all things Bush simply sets aside while he continues to tell us everything is a-ok.

I am anything but pleased on how this conflict has unfolded thus far and was merely pointing out the fact that it is ridiculous to give any real weight to the opinions of seven disgruntled GIs, considering the magnitude of the entire situation.

That's a fair statement I can agree with.

I am anything but pleased on how this conflict has unfolded thus far and was merely pointing out the fact that it is ridiculous to give any real weight to the opinions of seven disgruntled GIs, considering the magnitude of the entire situation.

 

Of course the bleeding hearts will never see it this way though and will continue to overstate its impact...

Well said and exactly how I feel.

Wow, can anybody possibly imagine that all soldiers don't feel the same way?

 

That's just too mind-blowing to comprehend. :whistle

These are not drafted grunts voicing their opinion. They're volunteers, and part of the 82nd Airborne. Both infantrymen and non-commissioned officers. I'm kind of surprised that they're not taking more flak for voicing their point of view, which differs from the point of view of their commanders. That's not something done lightly. Some might even call it treasonous. But to me, they are patriots.

Anecdotal evidence doesn't hold up in the court of law very well.

 

 

Honestly, this is non news. I know people who couldn't wait to go to Iraq (well, person...works for a contractor) and others who went and came back with nothing positive or negative to say.

 

 

 

However, as an oped piece on its own, it brings up several points of discussion which is our god-given right as Americans to do so. God bless free speech.

I am anything but pleased on how this conflict has unfolded thus far and was merely pointing out the fact that it is ridiculous to give any real weight to the opinions of seven disgruntled GIs, considering the magnitude of the entire situation.

 

Of course the bleeding hearts will never see it this way though and will continue to overstate its impact...

Just so you know, there are more than seven disgruntled soldier in the Army. Oh, and GI's is generally viewed as a very disrespectful term. It personally offends me as a veteran.

I work in a business that has a large number of customers that are servicemen. There are many complaints about how the policy / strategy has been / is being implemented. Most are in favor of staying. Many say that what we see on the news is nothing like how it is over there. Nearly all of them who are on active duty want to get back over there to help their comrades, nearly all of the reservists can't wait until their service is up.

This is semi-related to this thread....

 

We lost TWELVE guys yesterday in Iraq in a helicopter crash. Im not pro-war or anti-war (in terms of Iraq) but it just blew my mind when I was flipping through the paper this morning.

 

Think about how many lives were shattered in that one isolated incident.

I work in a business that has a large number of customers that are servicemen. There are many complaints about how the policy / strategy has been / is being implemented. Most are in favor of staying. Many say that what we see on the news is nothing like how it is over there. Nearly all of them who are on active duty want to get back over there to help their comrades, nearly all of the reservists can't wait until their service is up.

100% truth.

This is semi-related to this thread....

 

We lost TWELVE guys yesterday in Iraq in a helicopter crash. Im not pro-war or anti-war (in terms of Iraq) but it just blew my mind when I was flipping through the paper this morning.

 

Think about how many lives were shattered in that one isolated incident.

 

I know, not just the men/women lost, but there are wives or husbands at home whose lives will never be the same. Kids will have lost a parent forever. Parents left to bury their child. An interview with a father of a killed solider said "this was our only child, the family line will have ended here." I can't imagine the grief and despair these families must feel, even while being proud of them. Not to mention the ones who come home with injuries or amputated limbs or mental problems and the lifetime of hardships ahead of them.

 

These people know what they're volunteering for, I don't have any delusions about the kind of work they do and risks they take. And in the grand scale of things, the number of U.S. lives lost in Iraq pales in comparison to things like Vietnam and earlier conflicts. Doesn't make it any easier though. And the number of Iraqi lives lost is staggering.

 

I'm still conflicted about a pull-out. As opposed as I've been to this war and what a naive asinine job that Bush & Co. did, I'm still concerned that we'll have caused a huge clusterf*ck and then just left it to deteriorate even worse. I don't know what the answer is. It may be that the hatreds there just run too deep.